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Countering the Contagion 
Effect of COVID-19:  




For China to realise its millennium goal, it needs to radiate its influence 
globally and simultaneously engage internally with the local population 
to ensure social stability. COVID-19 has disrupted China’s dream 
of showcasing to the world a model state with Chinese characteristics. 
Influence operations thus form the basis of curating and presenting a 
credible image of the Communist Party of China (CPC) besides altering 
the behaviour of its adversaries. China has tried to firewall the western 
influence besides making inroads into other countries’ economic, political 
and societal institu ions. At the time of COVID-19 cr sis, it is employing 
leverages to correct the narrative while aining situational awareness 
through revamped structures and employment of technologies. It is thus 
imperative to appraise China’s influence operations capabilities.
Introduction
On 8 September 2020, China celebrated the success against the 
COVID-19. Chinese President Xi Jinping in his lengthy speech at the 
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Great Hall of the People used the occasion to recount the merits of the 
one-party rule and emphasised the need for strong leadership as “the most 
reliable backbone” for the Chinese people in times of crisis.1 According 
to World Health Organization (WHO), there have been 45,942,902 
cases with 1,192,644 deaths worldwide; while in China, there have been 
91,921 cases with 4746 deaths, as on 1 November 2020.2
Though China may be rejoicing and showcasing to the world and 
their local populace that it has been able to tame the pandemic, but 
it is aware of the headwind facing it. The origin and delay in sharing 
COVID-19 specimen details with the world and naming it as ‘Wuhan 
Virus’ or the ‘China Virus’ has tarnished China’s image. China does not 
want history to be unkind to it, and it is set to face the world squarely 
through its influence mechanism. 
With the United States (US) being affected the most under 
COVID-19, with more people lost to a pandemic than it did during 
the raid on Pearl Harbour during World War II or the attack on the 
World Trade Centre on 11 September 2000; the US is leading the charge 
against China over handling of COVID-19 by manipulating the WHO. 
The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo even justified the US unilateral 
action of quitting the WHO.3 The sequence of events leading to the 
pronouncement by the WHO of declaring COVID-19 as a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on 30 January 2020, has 
been at the centre of the debate. Incidentally, the initial WHO timeline 
was replaced on 29 June 2020, with the curated version by the WHO 
to set the record straight.4 According to WHO’s initial statement the 
cluster of cases of pneumonia of unknown cause was noticed by Chinese 
authorities in its Wuhan City, Hubei Province, on 31 December 2019, 
and genetic sequence of identified COVID-19 was shared on January 12, 
2020; and it was only on 11 March 2020, WHO declared COVID-19 as 
a ‘pandemic.’
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Contextualising COVID-19: The Pre-COVID Actions  
by China
Quelling the Truth
China’s core national defence aim is to safeguard national political 
security, people’s security and social stability.5 China seemed to be well 
aware of the pandemic fallout on the society and had probably assessed 
the capability degradation to administer and control the movement 
of populations.6 The foremost priority for the CPC, therefore, was to 
deal with societal turbulence and to quell any noise within the medical 
and media fraternity. This was evident from the quick reaction by the 
China Public Security Bureau to suppress Dr. Li Wenliang’s warning of a 
SARSs-like virus in Wuhan on 30 December 2019—an issue that had the 
potential to disturb the social order. 
The timing of disclosure and messaging are of importance to the 
CPC. By mid-December 2019, the guidelines for the local journalists 
were issued by the CPC to ensure content sanctity includes cinema, TV, 
journalism, music, radio, social media and all the new ways to consume 
content. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the Chinese 
government’s watchdog, has set up supervision on platforms that include 
those run by microblogging service provider Sina Weibo, short video 
and news apps operator ByteDance, and Tencent Holdings, WeChat app 
known as Weixin in mainland China where it has more than 1 billion 
users. “WeChat account shutdowns” became a trending topic on Weibo 
before the discussion page was removed on 6 February 2020.7
Ramping up the Effort
Despite growing cases in Wuhan, China carefully weighed the pros 
and cons with the nurtured support at the WHO. While the flurry of 
activities was taking place at WHO emergency committee to submit the 
report, China used the period to ramp up the state machinery in a quasi-
COUNTERING THE CONTAGION EFFECT OF COVID-19























warlike mode to deal with the virus which it knew to be pandemic. The 
leadership was probably aware of the unknown virus. Hence, it used the 
time to secure the supplies of epidemic related medical equipment from 
the worldwide market, including the US, which exported 2.4 million 
pieces to China between 24 January and 29 February 2020.8 
Almost a week before the WHO declared COVID-19 as a pandemic, 
Xi Jinping on 25 January, on the eve of the Chinese New Year of Rat, 
declared the tough measures to tackle the COVID-19 threat which had 
Wuhan at its epicentre. Within a day Premier Li Keqiang was made the 
head of the leading small group of epidemic control with 32 departments 
established under its wing, mobilisation of the People’s Armed Police 
(PAP), activation of PLA Logistics Command at Wuhan and pairing of 
19 provincial regions with 16 cities to prepare for Hubei-like outbreak of 
the COVID-19. 
Pushing the Narrative in the Post-COVID-19 World by the CPC
The CPC intended to showcase the existence of strong command 
governance system under Xi. The agile governance narrative was woven 
to tell the citizen in China and the world community at large that the 
CPC cared for its people and the willing participation by the people 
helped in stemming the pandemic outbreak. The WeChat and Weibo 
were put under vigilance. Amidst global destabilisation, the strategic 
objective for Xi Jinping is clear—to protect the supremacy of the CPC 
and prevent the snowballing of crisis. It endeavours to localise the impact 
due to COVID-19 while ensuring social stability within its borders so 
that its millennium goal of prosperity remains intact. For the CPC, 
its image is very important to it. It needs to be seen as the champion 
of the Chinese cause. China recognises that the stigmatisation due to 
COVID-19 will add another humiliation narrative attributing to the 
CPC rule—a narrative it can ill afford. Hence, employing the ‘three 
warfare’ strategy is the only choice available to it to control the opinion, 
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legal and psychological space to correct the battle of perceptions both 
locally and internationally. 
The CPC’s bigger concern rested on handling of the narrative 
coming out from Wuhan. As a result of which, Ms Sun Chunlan, the 
Vice Premier and former United Force Work Department (UFWD) 
minister,9 was appointed instead of an epidemic expert to deal with the 
Wuhan crisis. A Big-Data surveillance plan through mobile applications 
like AliPay and WeChat were used to enforce restrictions and allowed 
the government to keep track of people’s movement. The news of the 
mysterious disappearance of 21 million mobile users10 at the start of the 
pandemic had to be refuted. To communicate the curated images and 
assuage the local population apprehensions, daily briefings by the State 
Council were undertaken. Chinese prowess in dealing with the epidemic 
was showcased by building of a 1000-bed hospital over ten days with 
the two-pronged aim—firstly to calm the population about the lack of 
medical facility and secondly to market Chinese healthcare systems to the 
countries tied to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).11 
To further control the narrative, Research Paper Sanitisation Directive 
was promulgated for the research scholars.12 Sponsored research such as 
“China’s Fight against COVID-19” was jointly compiled by China Daily, 
Tsinghua University and Peking Union Medical College was published to 
showcase agile governance, strong leadership of President Xi and applause 
people’s contribution in containing the virus.13 Besides, China’s National 
Library has been tasked to record the history of COVID-19.14 
The world, distanced, divided and destabilised, is being shaped by 
geoeconomics and geopolitical tumult. The origin of COVID-19 or so 
called ‘China Virus’ seriously impacts the credibility and image of China 
and the CPC. The Party is therefore fully engaged in a concerted influence 
war to show the world that the handling of the pandemic by the liberal 
democracies of the world has been casual and causal for its spread. At the 
same time, it intends to firewall any UN-led initiative to trace its origin 
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of the COVID-19 as alluded by the UN Secretary-General, Antonio 
Guterres.15 While the world is struggling to deal with the pandemic 
spread, the CPC has its game plan cut out that entails: first, concerted 
influence operations to correct the narrative globally. Second, employ 
situational awareness programme to gain strategic intelligence. And third, 
localise conflict through a well-orchestrated war-control strategy
China’s Influence Operations
Influence operation relies on persistent communication capability driven 
by the content, carrier and the audience compartmentalised into echo 
chambers to alter their behaviour. The content weaves the narrative that 
is controlled, curated and filtered and disseminated to the masses, and 
the global audience in accordance with the CPC guidelines. The modern 
world has made communication ubiquitous with exponential pace of 
proliferation. The problem that China encountered with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union was the rapid growth driven by the internet explosion 
and the ability of the western world to penetrate Chinese society 
through new innovative products from social media platforms, to search 
engines tools to smartphones. The cyber dependency tied to economic 
and societal progress created vulnerabilities for the CPC to control the 
narrative. Behavioural dynamics attributed to social platforms have also 
triggered protests in Hong Kong and Arab Spring. Hence, to firewall, the 
vulnerabilities shaped by influence mechanism, the CPC has instituted 
multi-pronged measures, as discussed below.
Securing Data, Cyber and Space
The Internet of Thing (IoT) led by Big Data is supported through 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), and quantum computing tools to handle 
the veracity, velocity and volume of data flow. It created echo chambers 
based on the individual choices. The data tool is used to trigger tailored 
responses against the targeted audience. The intent is to infuse and sustain 
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a narrative and eclipse it if it turns negative. Thus, overdependence on 
data technologies across governance structure, business and financial 
environment is guiding the new age competition and conflict. Data 
breaches and cyber-attacks have emerged as the top global risks. Since the 
data economy is reliant on cyber and space for storage and flow of data, 
hence, it has tasked the PLA to protect and secure the critical domains 
of cyber and space. Thus, structures within the CPC and PLA have been 
reformed and revamped to deal with the influence operations. 
Securing Strategic Technologies
According to 2017 PricewaterhouseCoopers report, China has pre-
empted the US in rolling the 5G connectivity and AI. It has used predatory 
methods to secure strategic technologies to bridge the capability gap. 
The large efforts of its agencies are also devoted to influence and obtain 
key technologies. Some of them may fall within the economic realm, 
but most of the targeted source is through cyber business espionage and 
intelligence-based operations. The Chinese modus operandi is outlined 
in Table 1.
Table 1: China’s Modus Operandi to acquire Technology and 
Talent for Capability Development 
Joint Ventures (JV) Uses JVs for acquiring technology and 
technical know-how.
Research Partnerships Seek partnerships with government laboratories 
to acquire specific technology and soft skills to 
run such facilities.
Academic Collaborations Uses collaboration with universities to acquire 
specific research and gain access to high-end 
research equipment.
S&T Investments Sustained long-term state investments in S&T 
infrastructure.
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Merger & Acquisitions Seeks to buy companies tied to technology and 
talent.
Front Companies To obscure the CPC links in acquiring export-
controlled technologies.
Talent Recruitment Influence foreign talent to work for Chinese 
key projects.
Intelligence Services The Ministry of State Security and intelligence 
units are deployed to acquire technologies.
Legal and Regulatory China uses the law to disadvantage foreign 
companies.
Source: Adapted from National Counterintelligence and Security Center (2018).16
Firewalling Cybersecurity through the Legal Framework
In 2017, China legislated Cybersecurity Law to ensure ‘Hierarchical 
Protection of Information Security’—to mandate localisation of 
data in China while making the network operators responsible for 
cybersecurity. The sales of critical cybersecurity products are subjected 
to security certification. Article 38 of the law imposes a steep penalty on 
compromising the critical information that may cause serious damage to 
national security, economy and public interest as notified by the State 
Council. Thus, legislation has been used to allow predatory practices by 
the CPC.
Predatory Practices
On 1 December 2019, China rolled out Cybersecurity Multi-level 
Protection Scheme (MLPS 2.0) to deal with emerging technologies 
like mobile applications, Big Data, cloud computing and IoT. On 1 
March 2020, Information Security Technology—Implementation Guide 
for Classified Protection of Cyber Security17 was legislated to regulate 
technical and organisational internet security controls of companies and 
individuals. Thus, it allows the Ministry of Public Security and the CCAC 
and the Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs have 
complete access to regulate the internet, and control content. The aim is 
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to firewall Chinese interests through surveillance and controlling the flow 
of data out of the Ministry of Public Security precinct. However, the data 
is available to be used by the CPC to bolster state-owned enterprises like 
the CETC, Huawei, and others. 
Strengthening Cyber Defence
According to the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, ‘low cost, high benefit 
and low risks’ is what makes cyberwar a preferred tool for influencing. The 
publication is sceptical of the US military and the phenomenal overreach 
of FANG (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google) to undermine the 
society. The cyber defence measures initiated by the CPC include: First, 
alternate applications, to provide alternate flavour to its society, China 
has mirrored the social platform by creating BAT (Baidu, Alibaba and 
Tencent) while banning Facebook, Twitter, etc. The list of mirrored 
platforms is in Table 2. It allows China to monitor content and control 
its spread which was effectively used by the cyber agencies of China to 
prevent the societal disturbance during COVID-19 outbreak.18 
Table 2: List of Mirrored Apps by China
Chinese Platform Mirrored Equivalent
WeChat Facebook
Sina Weibo Twitter
Tencent QQ Instant Messenger
Zhihu The Quora of China
DouYin (TikTok) Short-video App akin to YouTube
Youku Tudou Former YouTube of China
Baidu Tieba A Search Engine Forum
Momo Tinder of China
Maimai LinkedIn of China
Source: Prepared by the Author with reference to DeGennaro (2020) .19
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Second, indigenous technology Development based on 5G and AI, 
to firewall outside influence and improve its penetration across the globe, 
China has invested heavily in localising the Information Communication 
Technology (ICT) industry aided by 5G and AI. According to CCAC, 
China has 802 million netizens and a digital economy of US$ 3.86 trillion, 
and it estimates that the cybersecurity market by 2021 may reach US$ 
11.2 trillion. Thus, China is keen to bite into this exclusive market share. 
The leaked files of China Zhenhua Data Information Technology with 
suspected connections with the Ministry of State Security intelligence 
service reveal that it has collected data on more than two-million 
prominent individuals worldwide including 10,000 Indians using AI-
enabled algorithm.20 
Controlling Influencers
Chinese firms have courted Hollywood’s film industry to control the 
influencers. More than half of the ten best movies of 2019 selected by 
Time magazine were financed by Beijing-friendly firms, such as Tencent 
Pictures, Sunac Group, Shanghai Road Pictures Film and Television, 
Media Asia Film, and Bona Film Group. Chinese conglomerate Wang 
Jianlin, founder of Dalian Wanda and member of CPC acquired US 
AMC Entertainment for US$ 2.6 billion in May 2012, and Hollywood 
studio Legendary Entertainment and theatre Carmike Cinemas in 2016 
raising heckles within the US policymakers. According to a report by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, China became the world’s largest cinema 
market in 2020, with box office revenue expected to jump to US$ 15.5 
billion by 2023.21 Thus, Chinese firms are seizing every opportunity to 
shape China’s external image.
Media Remodelling
China has put its weight behind its foreign-language news outlets to regulate 
the narratives. In December 2016, CCTV (the state television broadcasting 
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news service), rebranded itself as China Global Television Network (CGTN). 
It broadcasts six channels in English, Arabic, French, Russian, and Spanish 
with reporting teams in more than 70 countries. Xinhua—the Party’s 
primary news agency—has almost 200 foreign bureaus;22 while China Daily 
and Global Times publish English language editions. In March 2018, CCTV, 
CRI, and China National Radio were merged to form the China Media 
Group, also called Voice of China, led by the Propaganda Department of the 
Central Committee of the CPC.23 China Radio International broadcasts 392 
hours of programming each day in almost 38 languages from 27 overseas 
bureaus.24 The November 2015 Reuters investigation reports show that the 
media firms also covertly run influence operations through more than 30 
radio stations in 14 countries through front companies. On 15 December 
2019, the code of ethics legislated for the Chinese journalists makes it clear 
to them to “safeguard the political and the cultural security of the country” 
besides ensuring social stability.25 Hence, the domestic media in China is the 
CPC’s key mouthpiece. 
Education Exchanges
China has more than 541 Confucius Institutes spread across six 
continents and affiliated with China’s ministry of education mirroring 
cultural associations like the UK’s British Councils, but it partners with 
universities.26 Broader concerns about improper influence over teaching 
and research, industrial and military espionage surveillance prompted 
the US to enact Foreign Influence Transparency Act in March 2018 
to regulate the funding in the US academic colleges. China has tried 
to improve the ranking of its institutions like Peking University and 
Tsinghua University as it helps in gaining access and controlling research. 
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA) have been involved 
in promoting party works and reporting against the dissidents within the 
domestic and foreign universities. They are guided by the CPC members 
at the embassies.27 
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Economic Inducement and Ambushes
China has used BRI as a platform to showcase its economic prowess to 
the beleaguered nations across the world. The whole attempt is to create 
client state and support for the Chinese model of governance. It also 
aggressively looked at acquiring economic stakes in successful businesses 
across the world given the economic meltdown post-COVID outbreak. 
The large stake acquisition in India’s financial bank prompted India to 
review its Foreign Direct Investment policy in April 2020.28 
Influence Operations Stake Holders
China’s international influence activities groups are the External 
Propaganda Leading Group, which has a dual bureaucratic identity as the 
State Council Information Office; the Central Committee Propaganda 
Department; the Central Committee UFWD; the Central Committee 
Foreign Affairs Commission; and the Central Committee Education 
Leading Small Group. Although bureaucratically ranked slightly lower, 
the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Education, the 
newly created Voice of China, and the Xinhua News Agency all exercise 
policy formulation and oversight roles in their functional domains. The 
two major players in China influence operations are the UFWD and the 
PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). 
UFWD-China’s Magic Weapon
UFWD coordinates influence operations related to the management 
of potential opposition groups inside China and is now geared for 
important foreign influence mission too. Xi Jinping has energised 
a century-old organisation by adding almost 40,000 new UFWD 
cadres in first few years of his Presidency29 and established a leading 
small group on UFWD with himself at its head, signifying a direct 
line of command from CPC Politburo to UFWD. The UFWD has 
been actively involved in implementing the Chinese ‘three warfares’ 
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strategy in concert with the Central Military Commission (CMC) and 
Ministry of State Security. It looks deeply into the fault lines and has 
invested in social engineering using cyber tools, political subversion, 
and supporting anti-national elements. The surreptitious ploy also 
aims to instigate the neighbours of country in dispute with China. 
It can be seen by browsing the credentials of Chinese ambassadors 
posted to South Asian countries. Nong Rong, Ambassador to Pakistan; 
Li Jiming the current representative in Bangladesh; and former 
Chinese Ambassador to Sri Lanka Cheng Xueyuan all have links with 
the UFWD. Even the Chinese Ambassador in Nepal Hou Yonqi was 
Director, Department of External Security Affairs in 2012-2013, and 
has been at the forefront of keeping the communist movement in 
Nepal together and engineering conflict with India on border issues.30 
Figure 1: United Front Works Department (UFWD)  
Bureaus and Affiliations
Source: Adapted from Cole (2017).31
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PLASSF-New Information Warfare Force
Military strategists in China have laid out a “unified field theory” of war in 
which the kinetic dimension is no longer dominant.32 The articulation on 
“Unrestricted Warfare” or “wars beyond rules” by Senior Colonels from 
the PLA, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui simply illustrate that warfare 
has extended beyond the preserve of the military and civil-military fusion 
is the trend. Dual-use technologies like AI, 5G, robotics, unmanned 
systems and sensors, have been associated with economic development 
as well as security management. Mega-corporations’ participation in the 
development of dual-use technologies has aggravated security concerns. 
China is enamoured by the big tech-giants in the US who are not only 
commercially engaged across the world but are intricately linked to the 
Pentagon. It feels that the information domain is a strategic space created 
by the western world to undertake influence operations by shaping the 
opinion and occupying the cognitive space of leadership and society. 
The colour revolution and the Hong Kong 2019 protests have 
reconfirmed their hypothesis. Strategy to influence has emerged through 
synchronous effort provided by space, cyber and electromagnetic 
technologies. China realises that besides strengthening its economy and 
securing its territorial sovereignty, it has to secure these new emerging 
sovereign domains through unlimited ways and calibrated asymmetrical 
response for effective control followed by a recalibrated response to retain 
the influence. The reforms ushered in 2016 by Xi was with an intent to 
restructure and rebalance the PLASSF to meet the demands of safeguarding 
China’s national security in the new era. The cyber tools provide an excellent 
means for manipulation and narrative insertion. The CPC has entrusted 
psychological and public opinion operations with the task of influencing 
political, economic and intellectuals in other countries and the objective 
of systematic penetration into systems of targeted country to the Network 
Systems Department (NSD) of the PLASSF while the strategic information 
support has been given to the Space Support Department (SSD).
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The NSD dovetailed computer network attack handled by the GSD 
Fourth Department (4PLA), the GSD Informatisation Department 
handling the PLA counter-network defence operations and the cyber-
espionage elements of the former 3PLA except for the PLA’s counter-
network defence mission, which remains with the JSD Information 
Support Base under its Network Security Defence Centre.33 NSD retains 
the headquarters of the former 3PLA along with its twelve bureau-centric 
structure.34 These bureaus are tasked to collect intelligence by targeting 
the government, defence, research and technology sectors, including 
the specific targeting of space, aerospace, and communications. Cyber 
espionage remains the low-cost high yield approach by China to acquire 
economic and technological know-how to bridge the capability gap in 
niche technologies and enable wealth creation besides image build-up. 
SSD-The Space Force
The SSD has consolidated almost all aspects of PLA space operations 
including space launch, telemetry, tracking, control and space intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance measures. The Aerospace Reconnaissance 
Bureau of PLA Second Department (2 PLA) has been transferred to SSD 
for strategic intelligence collection while the balance 2 PLA has been 
merged with the Joint Staff Division (JSD) for carrying out human 
intelligence, signals intelligence and management of clandestine agents 
and military attaches. According to 2019 US DIA report, China views 
space superiority as part of its ability to control the information sphere. 
It aims to replace the GPS in BRI countries with its own BeiDou Satellite 
system. It has even tested anti-satellite weapons and directed energy 
weapons as part of non-nuclear deterrence capability. According to 2013 
Science of Military Strategy, the three critical components to achieve 
the goals of deterrence are ‘magnitude of deterrence, determination, 
and information conveyance.’ The methods to be employed intend to 
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‘increase the number of strategic options and enhance strategic flexibility 
to prevent or win war, secure stability and defend interests.’
Building Situational Awareness 
Influence operations ride on the wealth of intelligence inputs. Situational 
awareness is something that China relies on to build response options. It 
has used surveillance technology infusion in governance to secure internal 
stability. Yet, the gap exists at the global level, which it needs to bridge 
or create an asymmetric capability to block the access to information 
to technologically superior powers. PLA is aware of the US Strategic 
Command outreach based on the transparency provided by the US Global 
Information Grid and ability of the US to target critical infrastructure within 
and outside China. Computing, storage and communication survivability is 
therefore an essential imperative for China. Strengthening space situational 
awareness and freedom to operate and communicate is part of situational 
awareness developmental overdrive by the PLA. These initiatives include 
unhackable ISR systems. Few initiatives undertaken by China are as follows:
Early Warning System
China Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC) has been at the 
helm of putting China on the map of high-end radar besides laying the 
foundation of missile defence and development of laser and nuclear 
EMP systems as part of the nuclear missile defence system.35 Long-
range phased array radars (LPAR) in P Band with 4000 km range 
helps in ballistic missile tracking.36 To counter the stealth bombers, it 
has developed anti-stealth radar-like SLC-7 and YLC-8B. To ensure 
the survivability of radar systems to electronic warfare measures, it 
has developed jamming resistant JY 27 A VHF active electronically 
scanned array (AESA) radars that form the backbone of China’s PLAAF 
and PLAN airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems. 
The quantum radar technology by CETC makes stealth technology 
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redundant as it allows better discrimination properties.37 The ground-
penetrating radar, Eagle Eye-A, built under China Aerospace Science 
and Industry Corporation is capable of detecting soil, pipelines and 
even tunnels as deep as six meters underground. Its integration of 
AI system and BeiDou satellite navigation and GPS systems allows 
the efficiency of auto-detection and high precision positioning of 
underground targets.38
Unmanned Surveillance System
The JY-300 (Tian Shao) which has a range of more than 1,000 km 
and a practical ceiling of more than 5,000 metres, is the world’s first 
unmanned Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. It 
integrates radars with the airframe, which means radar antennae are part 
of the craft’s skin.39 It is likely to have fielded stealthy Shendiao for early 
warning. Morning Star and Rainbow are being developed for persistent 
surveillance for months as launch on-demand systems thus providing an 
alternative to satellites with greater flexibility.40
Space System
China has developed a robust architecture of space systems to support 
its strategic situational awareness. Though there is a large difference 
in holding of satellites between China and the US, the Chinese ranks 
second after the US in terms of the number of satellites that are 
currently operational. These satellites provide a wide range of sensors 
that include ELINT, electro-optical (EO) sensors, synthetic aperture 
radar (SAR), staring camera, stereoscopic imagers, and hyperspectral, 
among others. 
Maritime Surveillance
The PLAN, with its global commitment and competition along 
its island chains, recognises the importance of a maritime strategic 
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early warning system. The PLAN maritime surveillance capabilities 
are through the sea- and space-based systems, ranging from the 
launch of satellites dedicated to that mission to the construction 
of an ‘underwater great wall’ of sensors, augmented by a range of 
underwater sensors and unmanned and autonomous underwater 
vehicles. China’s militarisation of the South China Sea has involved 
the placement of a network of radars on its various installations on 
features, such as Fiery Cross, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. These 
radars may contribute to early warning, signals intelligence, and even 
stealth detection, including via high-frequency arrays. 
Laser Surveillance System
China has heavily invested in the use of Lidar (a portmanteau of light and 
radar), AI and 5G technologies to synergise detection and dissemination 
of the images and intelligence. Lidar uses ultraviolet, visible, or near-
infrared light to image objects. It can be used with a wide range of 
targets, including non-metallic objects, rocks, rain, chemical compounds, 
aerosols, clouds and even single molecules. However, it has an atrophying 
effect in fog and murky water. China’s new satellite ‘Project Guanlan’ 
which means ‘watching the big waves’ launched in May 2019 at the 
Pilot National Laboratory in Qingdao uses high-powered lasers to spot 
objects deep underwater up to 500 metres. It is capable of scanning an 
area of around 100 km on land. When used alongs de microwave radar, 
it can scan and identify surface movement and also penetrate through the 
foliage. A narrow laser beam can be used to map physical features with 
very high resolution. It brings transparency both on land and sea and 
exposes weapon systems like submarines.41
Modernising Command and Control Network
The PLA intends achieving networked C4ISR and counter-C4ISR 
capabilities that enable systems and subsystems to kinetically or non-
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kinetically defeat or paralyse the enemy’s decision support systems. China’s 
advances in space-based capabilities, drone technology, and information 
processing could provide sufficient means to provide situational awareness 
and targeting quality data to overseas Chinese forces anywhere in the 
world by 2030 or 2035.42 5G has been developed by Chinese defence 
academics and engineers to improve battlefield communications with 
faster and more stable information transmission, increasing the timeliness 
and integration of information. The increased bandwidth could help the 
PLA to ‘intelligentise’ its military. 
Conclusion
Situational awareness and influence operations go hand in gloves. In 
future, China could employ more integrated strategic early warning 
systems. While the PLA has made rapid stride in technology infusion, 
but it is saddled with legacy equipment, and integration of these systems 
is a challenge. The efforts of the Chinese defence industry, particularly 
those of CETC, in providing improved datalinks for real-time sharing 
and integration of intelligence for enhanced situational awareness have 
matured. PLASSF, as the new informational umbrella and custodian of 
the situational awareness engine, is responsible for facilitating information 
transmission, processing, and distribution, and for supporting early 
warning. Devising hack-free algorithm is an area China aims to have 
information parity with the US and information dominance against 
countries with which it has disputed. It is rapidly exploring the fields of 
quantum technologies to provide resilience to its communication, sensor 
technologies and space exploration.
Pandemic has created chaos of an unprecedented kind. The nations 
struggling to contain the pandemic with limited capabilities are finding 
themselves overwhelmed by the enormity of the crisis. However, amidst 
this chaos, China finds itself securely perched having braved the initial 
brunt of contagion attack, and now it is focussed to advance its agenda 
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of influence and image preservation. The likely Chinese strategy of 
handling this crisis may be akin to ‘influence-beachhead’ by China into 
other countries’ strategic interests. The pandemic has thrown open 
major fault lines across the world which are being carefully studied by 
China and will form part of new developing warfare—virtual societal 
warfare with psychological impacts vectored in leadership choice of 
response. 
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